"PUBLICS" SPEAKING: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NAFTA, GATT, AND CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 187 IN MEXICO AND THE U.S.

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Working Paper No. 6
Chicano/Latino Research Center

January, 1996
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Publics: Who Counts?

With the word "public," I intend to invoke several ironies in talking about "public" policies like NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement, or el TLC, Tratado de Libre Comercio) and GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). First of all, there is the irony of "representative" government: where are the social contracts that authorized national leaders Mulroney, Bush, and Salinas de Gortari to sign a document that gave rights to transnational corporations on behalf of national citizens?²

A second irony is that the "publics" represented by the North American Free Trade Agreement³ had very little access to the documents we had supposedly authorized. In the background section of this working paper, I document the relative accessibility of the policy documents in each of the three North American nations.

The third ironic use of "public" here is that the term "a public" is often used to include,

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¹ A version of this paper was presented as a talk on April 5, 1995, in the Chicano/Latino Research Center Spring 1995 Colloquium Series. Ivelisse Rivera Bonilla, with René Ortega, has edited this paper substantially for the CLRC Working Paper Series; they have my gratitude. I also want to thank Miguel Morayta, Jorge Carrasco Araizaga, Adriana Sandoval, Erika Rand, Bill Aurand, Aaron Howe, Steve Spellman, and all those who spoke with us for their active role in this research; Olga Nájera-Ramírez, Frances Rothstein, Claudio Lomnitz, Kathy Chetkovich and Mark Whitaker for their helpful comments on this working paper; Marcela Moya and Elizabeth Sanin for their tireless transcription; and the Chicano/Latino Research Center, at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and the Centro de Investigaciones Sobre América del Norte, UNAM, for their encouragement of this project.

² While national leaders may have constitutional power to sign transnational economic treaties, I think we are experiencing a social moment of questioning the extent and implications of this.

³ I think it is significant that the English word "agreement" was used in NAFTA rather than the direct translation of tratado, "treaty." Agreement seems symbolically less binding.
vaguely, everyone who would be affected by a policy, or who pertains to a polity; yet, as a
gloss for inclusiveness, it is often used to exclude. In discussions of NAFTA, for example,
national "publics" have been, at times, collapsed into iconic representations that do NOT
represent the heterogeneity of Mexico or Canada or the U.S. Imagery of each nation as an
individual—with one class, as in "worker" for Mexico and "employer" for the U.S., or one
ethnicity, an even more problematic elision—has been common in political cartoons and
speeches about NAFTA. In November 1993, during the week of the U.S. Congressional vote on
NAFTA, the anthropologist Claudio Lomnitz (1993) pointed out that representations of Mexico
in U.S. discussions of NAFTA, whether in press or in social sciences, were more racialized than
ever, which was ironic since in the early 1990s, in Mexico, as in Canada, multicultural national
identity has been recognized more than ever before.

I believe it is important to study in what venues and by which processes "publics" are
constructed. I do not offer a single definition of "a public" here, since what I want to discuss is
a disparate set of invocations of audience for the consumption of political speechmaking and
political cartoons, and, alternatively, a national electorate, or the members of a union, or any
other group with implied agency. There is an inherent predicament for policymakers, I think.
They view as consumers of policy those who are, often, also attributed with originating the
representations of identity that show up in policies. But what if that backfires? What if people
say, as the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) has, "¡Basta!"

Here is an example of this double edge of a "public": President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) leader of Mexico, invoked campesinos as the
audience for his speeches promoting NAFTA/el TLC in rural areas, and never (for him) the more
politically troubling identity indígenas. In his final State of the Nation address (the sexto
informe), in November 1994, Salinas said:

In the countryside, through dialogue and joint efforts, we have made far-reaching
reforms to reactivate production with greater freedom and justice. Peasants now
have full rights over their lands through amendments to Article 27 of the
Constitution... Peasants have become the engineers of their own transformation.
(Salinas de Gortari 1994)
President Salinas de Gortari did not say how much agency he thought campesinos had accrued. But he did find it necessary to have the national military throw indígena activists (also identifying themselves as campesinos) out of the zócalo on the very day he went there to give the speech cited above. The speech, directed primarily to an international audience, is interesting, in this context, for its silencing, or nonrepresentation, of Mexico’s indígena public.

Some questions continually reinsert themselves in a consideration of publics constructed through discussions of policy: What is left out of a representation of identity at a given moment, and why? What are the power dynamics involved? Who feels entitled to represent a public? Who (along with their concerns) is not represented in the constructions of national identity invoked in discussions of public policy and people’s future?

What does it mean, for example, for Mexicans, to have a sombrero as the summarizing symbol (see Ortner 1973) for all of that nation’s regions, classes, and differing views in representations of political issues widely consumed in the U.S.? [Figure 1] The kind of thoughtful analysis Richard Flores (1995) has done of the vilifications of Mexicans through Hollywood imagery is helpful in addressing questions like this one. In order to understand the power that images can have in shaping ongoing cultural constructions of national identity, I think it is important to heed Guillermo Bonfil Batalla’s (1966) consistent reminder to anthropologists that we must look historically, internationally, and politically at interpretations that are both specific and general, local and nonlocal (whether by the press, academics, or other members of “the public” whose views are being summarized).

My second line of argument in this working paper is that it is vital to consider every speaker as a theory-maker. Academics try to make sense of events as does everyone else. But often, we are tempted in academic contexts to privilege disciplinary and disciplining theories over explanations seen as “untrained,” or, in Lukács’ view, as expressed through “false consciousness” (1967). Here, my project is to assemble a mosaic of explanations, rather than to impose a grid, of more and less analytically powerful models of policies and their effects, since it is that process that usually silences those without access to, or interest in, institutional
knowledge. It is an idiosyncratic mosaic.

In this working paper, then, I want to challenge the kinds of elision of "the public" I mentioned earlier by attending to some of the different voices that have spoken out about "public" policies—NAFTA, GATT, and California Proposition 187—in the U.S. and Mexico.

Given the variations in the way publics are constructed in discussions of NAFTA, what would "an informed public" mean? How much agency does a "public" have? The symbolic space of NAFTA, which has been constructed in the absence of the document NAFTA, has become a discursive site for questioning the authority of national governments in each of the three North American countries. The legitimacy of national governments to negotiate transnational identities and processes for which there is little precedent is being contested in various ways. This contestation ranges from the alternative nationalist position of Quebec to the feelings expressed by many of those I interviewed in the U.S. and Mexico of a lack of inclusion in the NAFTA negotiating process. For example, as the NAFTA votes were cast in the U.S. House of Representatives, in November 1993, I stood in line with a group of people who would not end up getting into the gallery, but who perhaps wanted to be physically near the process from which the public was largely excluded.

There is political and cultural precedent for many acts of transnational negotiation, but not for some of the issues for which NAFTA has become a summarizing symbol. For example, in the space opened by the absence of a circulating NAFTA document, questions have been asked about where jobs come from, and who should have them. In the gulf between the NAFTA and GATT policies and the public discussions of them, we have been muddling through some issues (and avoiding some others) on the minds of many in all three countries: livelihood, identity, ethnic relations, and the place of nations in what is already a web of transnational economic ties advantageous to some and not to others.
Background

Here follows an arbitrary chronology relevant to the policies about which I have interviewed rural residents of the states of Kentucky (U.S.) and Morelos (Mexico), and variously situated speakers in Mexico City between 1993 and 1995.

NAFTA has not been the first transnational trade agreement in North America, by any means. In 1854, for example, the Canada-U.S. Reciprocity Treaty took effect. It took eight years to negotiate this treaty which waived tariffs on 43 commodities, and was broken by the U.S. almost immediately (Kerr 1986).

North American nations have also been involved in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations for nearly 50 years. In January 1948, the GATT, proposed as a post-War policy by the U.S., was negotiated by Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. The International Trade Organization (ITO)—similar to what is now called the World Trade Organization which came into being in 1994—was proposed at that time (Contracting Parties to the GATT 1949). There was disagreement, however, and in 1950, the U.S. declared there would be no Congressional debate or approval of the International Trade Organization, the UN-related governing body linked to the GATT. As many have pointed out, the U.S. has consistently dominated transnational trade negotiations (cf. Pastor 1992, Semo 1993). Mexico, for example, did not join the GATT until 1986.

In 1951, The European Coal and Steel Community (the precursor to what is now the European Union) was created. In answer to my question about whether a similar economic community might be established through NAFTA/el TLC, a Mexican businessman told me in 1993 that if it had taken 40 years for the EC to get organized, one could not expect a North American community to emerge immediately with the passage of NAFTA, if at all.

In 1988, the text of the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was published widely in Canada, along with its implementing bill. Both were posted in libraries and published in news
magazines. A Senate-Commons committee held 13,000 public hearings across Canada on trade with the U.S. in general, and on the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, in particular (Citizen's Forum on Canada's Future 1991:131; Bain 1985:55). Notwithstanding opposition, that treaty went into effect on January 1, 1989.

Not long after that, in 1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas de Gortari called for the negotiation of a free trade agreement (NAFTA), which Canada did not join until February 5, 1991. Canadian negotiators had not only the historical memory of the U.S.' having broken the 1854 Canada-U.S. Reciprocity Treaty, but also had the very recent experiences of the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement to inform their decision. An example of Canadian public opposition to NAFTA was described to me by Jaffe and Gertler (personal communication, 1991) who said that farmers in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan worried that U.S. agricultural producers would flood Canadian markets, as they perceived had been the effect of the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

In 1992, I found through interviewing journalists and others in Mexico and the U.S. that the NAFTA document and negotiating team members' names were mostly inaccessible to members of the press, other citizens, and even political candidates—Bill Clinton, for example, as a presidential candidate opposing President Bush, announced that he could not obtain a copy of the more than 2,000-page NAFTA document until just before he had to publicly state his position on it on the eve of the elections. Those with the most access to the NAFTA document were members of the business community. For example, in 1992, the Mexican SECOFI (Secretaría de Comercio y Fomento Industrial, or Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development) office made a fifteen-year timeline of the implementation of NAFTA/el TLC available, without charge, to business people, through its library (SECOFI 1992). On the other hand, the PRI government spent more than $30 million publicizing NAFTA (Heredia 1993:27). However, as one rural Morelos resident put it in 1993, that publicity did not necessarily lead to an informed public: "No, no hay información. Nada más les dan a medias para que quede uno en el aire" (No, there's no information. They only give half so one will remain up in the air).
There were critical summaries, independent of the PRI government, of the document published in Mexico. One of them was the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas' counter-proposal to the treaty, issued in 1991, which stressed building ties with already-existing Latin American free trade areas. Jorge Castañeda and Carlos Heredia also published a counter-proposal which suggested a longer period of adjustment for workers in each country and transnational funds, similar to those established in the European Community, to facilitate that process (Castañeda 1993:11-41).

The two-tier dispersal of information about NAFTA (first, to business people, then to everyone else) was similar in the U.S. The more one was able to pay, the more access one could have to information about NAFTA—this created a select public for discussions of the document and its ramifications. A private printing company in Virginia, for example, was selling copies of the NAFTA document for $102.84 each, the most reasonable price of those investigated, according to an article in Nation's Business (Holzinger and Manzella 1992:25). Access to technology was a factor as well; in the "Bits & Bytes" section of Business Week there was an advertisement in October 1993 for a CD-ROM copy of the entire NAFTA document for $99. The U.S. Government Printing Office made the NAFTA document available for $41 to individuals, and over $200 to public libraries, in 1993.

In 1992, to encourage Canada and the U.S. to enter into el TLC/NAFTA, the Casa de Diputados (the Mexican legislature), responding to a 1991 proposal by President Salinas de Gortari, amended Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution to make it possible for ejiditarios—those holding communal land titles—to sell ejido lands to private holders. The impetus for this was that a corporation like Green Giant could buy, rather than lease, large plots of land in Mexico. While there had been informal leasing before the changes were made in Artículo 27, this act essentially removed the constitutional guarantee of access to communal land to Mexican citizens.

On December 17, 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney, and Presidents Bush and Salinas de Gortari, representing officially (and under some contestation) the "publics" of Canada, the
U.S., and Mexico, each signed NAFTA/el TLC in their national capitals. This meant that the policy could then be considered for ratification in each legislative body of North America.

In the year of NAFTA's consideration, 1993, I interviewed farmers in Kentucky and in Morelos. Two Kentucky farmers with whom I discussed NAFTA worried that if the policy passed, Argentinean agricultural products—specifically, tobacco—would flood U.S. markets. They had read that this would happen, in a farm magazine (Bickers 1993:60). On the other hand, the farmers I interviewed in several different communities in the state of Morelos, who were in the midst of a third year of severe drought, worried that high-tech U.S. farms would flood Mexican markets with produce.

Tensions about the changes in Article 27 and general economic conditions in Mexico led to violence (even before the passage of NAFTA and the public emergence of the EZLN on January 1, 1994). For example, in the summer of 1993, in response to weekly killings of young men by the state police, the townspeople in Jonacátepec, Morelos, put the police force in jail. Moreover, when the Governor came to negotiate for the release of the policemen, they took the Attorney General of Morelos into custody, as well. There were rumors of imminent armed conflict across rural Morelos. The governor had raised property taxes by 50% during the drought; this and other economic and political conditions were becoming intolerable, according to the campesinos who spoke with me.4

Just as in Canada and in the U.S., in Mexico there was not (contrary to the majority of media descriptions) a unified public in support of the passage of NAFTA/el TLC. In fact, there was considerable organized opposition, although there was no possible point of articulation between that opposition and the course of action of the government. There was, for example, the Red Mexicana Frente al Tratado de Libre Comercio (the Mexican Network Against NAFTA), which consisted of more than forty labor, environmental, women's, legal, and migrant research organizations. Migrants, in turn, constituted a public which was not often represented or

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4 Random killings of civilians by state forces have been even more numerous in the state of Guerrero, according to news and personal reports heard in fall 1995.
addressed in discussions of NAFTA, except, for example, in the anticipation of migrants from Mexico to replace professional workers in the U.S. for lower pay (Perot and Choate 1993:91). Contradicting a common representation of Mexicans as all low-wage workers (or those without capital, as opposed to those in the U.S. and Canada with capital) in the NAFTA debates, a Mexican television executive told me in 1993 that if NAFTA were to pass, "En 10 años, un mexicano comprará el edificio Empire State". (In 10 years, a Mexican will buy the Empire State building.)

In November, 1993, NAFTA was ratified in the U.S. Congress, after having passed already in Mexico. Prime Minister-Elect Chretien, of Canada, made a public announcement that the Canadian legislature or Prime Minister just might not have the power to make such a decision; but the decision stood. On January 1, 1994, NAFTA/el TLC went into effect. Also on that day, powerful public opposition to el TLC took the shape of an organized, armed rebellion in the state of Chiapas, Mexico. There were a number of popular organizations involved in taking a stand hacia la muerte (to the death) against NAFTA, which came to be a symbol of the eroding Constitutional rights and economic circumstances of Mexican citizens, but the one which has emerged as the summarizing group, given voice by Subcomandante Marcos, is the EZLN (el Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, or the Zapatistas). The use of Emiliano Zapata, slain military leader of the armed campesino revolt at the beginning of this century known as the Mexican Revolution, as the emblematic leader of this second campesino revolt at the end of the century, echoes powerfully the demand for Constitutional rights which members of the EZLN perceive Salinas, the PRI, and NAFTA to have revoked.

On November 2, 1994, President Salinas de Gortari gave his sexto informe, in which he summarized his accomplishments (and found himself in the predicament vis-à-vis the EZLN and related popular movements which I have already described). Six days later, Proposition 187 was passed on the California ballot (see Appendix I). That initiative, proposed by the Republican Governor of California Pete Wilson, denied social services (e.g., education and health care) to undocumented migrants in the state. In Mexico, this was interpreted by many I
interviewed as an affront to Mexican migrants who are essential laborers in California's vast agricultural industry.

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I return to events in this chronology in the illustrations to come in this working paper. In this project, approximately forty U.S. and Mexican citizens were selected for in-depth interviews based on their diversity—by age, gender, economic status, ethnicity, regional identity, occupation, access to media, and political views. Most of the conversations were initiated during the summer of 1993 (before the passage of NAFTA/el TLC), in rural Morelos and Mexico City, and I interviewed many of the same people again in the fall of 1995. Interviews during the summer of 1993 were done collaboratively, by Mexican and U.S. undergraduate students Adriana Sandoval, Erika Rand, Bill Aurand, Steve Spellman, and Aaron Howe; Mexican anthropologist Dr. Miguel Morayta M. and journalist Jorge Carrasco Araizaga; and myself. We also understood collaboration to include those who agreed to talk with us, and accorded their views the same authority as any academic textual account. Following is a montage of interpretations from selected individuals.

Interpretations of Public Policies, Pasts and Possibilities

I begin this section with the overview of one who was practically acquainted with the original Mexican Revolution, and could thus situate the recent changes in Article 27 in historical context. Sr. Hugo, a farmer of around 90 years in age, spoke with us in the summer of 1993 in Morelos about the Constitution, the drought, and the dire conditions which led to revolution before and which, he said, would lead to revolution again. Because he spoke in Spanish, I transcribe his words here in Spanish. (See Appendix II for an English translation.)

5 According to ethnographic convention, the names of collaborators in this research have sometimes been changed (as in this case) because of possible repercussions. Pseudonyms are used for the speakers in this paper since they were assured anonymity in exchange for their candor.
Pues, según lo que quiere, tal vez el gobierno se acabó con México. Porque, ¿a dónde vamos a ir? Ya empezó la crisis de los alimentos básicos, más con la cuestión de que no ha caído la lluvia. Ya los que tienen poquito maíz ya no lo venden. Ya no lo quieren vender porque dicen qué van a comer y ya los que no tienen maíz tienen que comprar. O ya, tal vez, ya no comen o qué se yo, no sé que le hace. Comen pan, o no sé...

Esa es la idea, que todos los de mayor edad pensamos que van a empezar a vender su ejido para tener, para sostén, para conseguir provisiones y pues, según yo, pues no sé, no entiendo por qué el gobierno ha aplicado el artículo 27. Según nos platicaron nuestros viejos pasados, que antes o sea el año de 1878, que venían gentes que tampoco sabían de dónde eran, ni de qué nación eran, venían y compraban un terreno y los vecinos tenían que firmar de la venta de ese terreno y al rato los que firmaron también les recogían. Era un robo, entonces. Por ahí va con el artículo 27 porque dice el gobierno que ahora tiene el derecho de vender su tierra a quien quieran y al precio que quieran.

Es un paso malo, porque eso ya pasó antes, ya sucedió con nuestros antepasados, entonces la hacienda se apropió, o sea, pues los españoles según España es que vino a apoderarse aquí compró a un precio tal vez caro, qué se yo, pero lo malo es que hubo, es que el vecino que tuvo que firmar también le recogió la tierra, si es que no compro todo el terreno si fue un robo.

Según el gobierno, con el cambio del artículo 27 que junte pues va de acuerdo con la moneda o en el cambio de la moneda, ¿cuál es el beneficio que va a tener el pobre? Si hoy está ganando 25...30,000 pesos, el peón no le alcanza para vivir, y ¿cómo es posible de que un 1,000 pesos baje a 1 peso? Si con 25,000 no le alcanza para vivir, ¿cómo va a alcanzar con 25 pesos? ¿Cómo va a sobrevivir?...

Para mí, entiendo eso, pues según dice el gobierno, [lo] que va a ser libre o ser libre el comercio, así es que quiere decir de una nación a otra van a traer comercio. Y de ésta van a llevar comercio, así es que es libre. Y eso, pues, no yo entiendo o no sé, si a ese multimillonario le va a ir bien con ese comercio que va a ser libre o se va a afectar. Porque de allí ya viene la competencia, entonces, que fabriquen mejor y metan cuartela, ese que va a vender. Eso ni de que, es como la bruta, la mejor bruta; tiene salida y la que no pierde se hecha a perder y pues para mí, ¡no!... La cuestión esa es de que "el pobre más pobre".
Habrá guerra.

Según dice nuestro presidente que pues que le va a ayudar a la comunidad con el cambio en el artículo 27 y la moneda. Pues mentira. Mentira. Es una gran mentira.

[Como en] el Porfiriato. Porque fue como los pobres de aquí de Morelos los hacían trabajar con la caña, cargar la caña entonces hasta que hubo un tal "Zapata" que quiso quitar el yugo del pobre... Mi padre [y mi tío] fueron revolucionarios....

Pues, si la agricultura pues pienso y que va, tiene que estar en pie porque es la materia prima. Son las provisiones que se trabajan para la vida, si se dan por ejemplo en una casa, que tengan, tengan cinco ó seis de familia, ocho con la madre y el padre, se irán unos cuatro y quedarán unos dos, para trabajar la tierra, para poderse sostener. Para que puedan sobrevivir el padre y la madre. Si todos se va a ir, ¿qué van a comer papa y mama rebanada del aire? Ese no se come. Necesitaría uno ser balón.

Sr. Hugo clearly anticipated the Zapatista revolution of January 1, 1994, based on his views of the history of transnational capital and tensions between the politicians' position that a policy would benefit "the public" and the repeated shortfall borne by that public. I mentioned briefly in the last section views expressed by at least some farmers in Canada and the U.S., also, to illustrate—together with the remarks of Sr. Hugo—that the circle of advantages, placed in many discussions of NAFTA in each country with the publics of other nations, seems to support the idea that NAFTA has become a summarizing symbol for anxieties about one's own locality and nation somehow losing in a global competition for capital. In some interviews, I found that capital was ascribed a will and personality of its own, though its identity may be mysterious, with accountability to no one for its actions. The power of images of capital and labor crossing borders has been strengthened, I think, by the inaccessibility of the NAFTA and GATT documents for public debate. In lieu of specific policies, what has been debated is the symbolic capital (see Bourdieu 1977) of national identity.

NAFTA itself has been attributed agency—with the power to help or to harm—in public
forums. There are these metaphorical representations, for example:

¡Me lleva el TLC! (NAFTA is killing me.)
(El Fisgón, Mexican cartoonist, 1993)

NAFTA is a giant Mexican truck in your rear-view mirror as you're driving down the road. (Ralph Nader 1993)

Waiting for the miracle. (NAFTA as panacea.)
(La Jornada, July 28, 1993) [See Figure 2]

The power of iconic, or summarizing nonverbal images, is their ability to convey as many meanings as possible, which is particularly useful to political candidates trying simultaneously to invoke agreement, disagreement, inclusion, exclusion, specificity and generality in every articulation of their views. In representing national identity, audiences for those acts of representation matter a great deal, of course.

An example of how one politician has invoked Mexican national identity, and even Latin American transnational identities, very differently for very different audiences may be found in California Governor Pete Wilson's statements, with reference to California ballot Proposition 187. For certain audiences, Wilson holds immigrants from the unspecified South (understood by many Mexicans and Californians as meaning Mexico) responsible for a panoply of problems in California, ranging from funds available for education and health care in the state to the incidence of crime. Yet, to a more restricted audience of Pacific Rim capitalists, with reference to NAFTA and GATT, he invoked Latin Americans' presence in California as positive proof of California's plural society and economy. In a speech delivered in 1992 to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, he stated:

As our nation's gateway to the Pacific, California itself is something of a Golden Gate, opening America to the extraordinary opportunities of the Pacific Rim. In fact, in the 1980s, America's trade with the Pacific Rim surpassed that with Atlantic basin countries.

Recent figures from California's World Trade Commission show that, despite the sluggish economy at home, last year in California exports grew by $4.7 billion, creating
Figure 2

La Jornada (Mexico)
July 28, 1993
nearly 50,000 new jobs. Whether it’s selling Central Valley fruit in Japan or Silicon Valley technology in Mexico, California is competing around the world by offering quality products at competitive prices.

Our people are no less diversified than our economy. The 32 million citizens of California constitute the most diverse society in the history of man. To paraphrase Churchill, ‘Never before have so many come from so far away to live so closely together...’

Parents from the highlands of Guatemala and Laos, from the cities of the Philippines and Nigeria, are sending their children to the same schools in Los Angeles, in Modesto and Marin. (I like to say that only in California can you order and actually get a kosher burrito, with a side order of kimchee.)

This diversity is one of California’s greatest assets in what is becoming an increasingly global market. For all these reasons, I like to say that California borders the world. (Governor Pete Wilson 1992)

While it is an obvious point that different representations of national and cultural identities are invoked for different audiences, I think it is interesting to look at the choices made in emphasizing or silencing aspects of those representations as intended audiences shift. For instance, in the aforementioned speech by Governor Wilson in 1992, the diversity he invokes is constituted through recent transnational migration rather than domestic ethnic diversity based on migrations with different histories, as with the African American diaspora. Another representational oddity, to me, is that those who speak of the Pacific Rim in the U.S., as Governor Wilson does in this speech, seldom include or emphasize Mexico or Canada as Pacific Rim nations.

Mexican journalists Jorge Carrasco Araizaga and David Torres, during a working visit to the U.S. in 1992, paid particular attention to shifts in the representations of national identity in discussions of NAFTA in Mexico and the U.S. They point out in their article that audiences cannot be so discretely segregated, and that, most significantly, audiences have memory:

In the U.S. press, there has been a significant departure from the depiction of Mexico that was standard until a few years ago. Mexicans still remember from
the early '80s New York Times articles by Jack Anderson on former president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, which portrayed Mexico as a land brimming with corruption and electoral fraud. They remember the broadcasts of congressional hearings on the drug trade. Until just before NAFTA, the U.S. media presented a steady stream of editorials, articles, and television programs about the problems with drug trafficking, as if it were the only activity in Mexico. This theme was a determining factor in the negative relations between Mexico and the United States.

A prime example of this sort of portrayal was the case of Enrique Camanera Salazar, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agent assassinated in Mexico. Soon afterward, newspapers across the United States printed a cartoon showing the Mexican national shield, with its Aztec eagle and serpent smoking marijuana. This image became the subject of a diplomatic conflict between Mexico and the United States in 1984 and '85 (Carrasco Araizaga and Torres 1992).

Editorial cartoons, with their iconic representations of national identity, are a flexible representation: they might be treated as outside the realm of the serious, especially in terms of national commitment to representations, or as the unrepessed voice of the people (as in El Fisgón's [1993] caricaturization of TLC issues).

While there are, of course, Mexicans, U.S. residents, and Canadians reading articles, seeing political cartoons, and listening to television and radio reports about NAFTA in countries other than their own, I will simply note the assumption that most reports and images are consumed "internally" by a national public with, somehow, a discrete national identity. Migrant audiences or texts are seldom taken into account, at least in the literature I have examined.

In addition to migrant "publics," an audience and group of agents for discussions of transnational policy that has been largely ignored by policymakers is young people. This is an especially important constituency in Mexico, where, in 1995, 50% of the population is under 24 years of age. In 1993, an 18-year-old student at UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, the national university of Mexico) expressed these views about discussions of el TLC.
(See Appendix II for an English translation.)

Q: ¿Por qué crees que se está diciendo mucho del tratado en México?
A: Porque está de moda.

Q: ¿No crees que haya alguna razón porque en México quieran que sepa todo eso?
A: En alguna parte leí que entre más informados estamos, más desinformados vamos a estar. O sea, entre más nos retaquemos de información, menos vamos a captar las cosas. Entonces, si tenemos un mayor campo de información por así decirlo y diario nos estén diciendo eso, creo que acabamos por hartarnos de ese tema y de plano no darle importancia y por eso estamos tan desinformados aunque nos esté llegando información por todas partes por lo mismo.

Another young person commented also on the 1993 news coverage in Mexico of el TLC that people were being told that the treaty "va a beneficiar esto o va a beneficiar esto o el otro, pero no dicen el por qué de las cosas" (is going to help with this or that or the other, but they don't really explain things.)

By the summer of 1993, el TLC had had three years of front-page attention in the Mexican press; there had been more than two years of public meetings and debate in Canada on NAFTA; and NAFTA had only been featured in the mainstream U.S. press for about three months. Just as coverage of NAFTA varied, so did interpretations of the most significant issues associated with the transnational treaty.

A lawyer who works in an agricultural collective with the son of Emiliano Zapata told us that the changes in Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution were much more significant than NAFTA for rural Mexicans. This view was held by a majority of those we interviewed in rural Morelos.

A member of the FAT—el Frente Auténtico de Trabajadores (the Authentic Workers’ Front), an organization of 40,000 laborers—who also served as a representative to the Red Mexicana Frente al Tratado de Libre Comercio told us that, as in the U.S., workers were divided about NAFTA, depending on the economic sectors most affected, and their positions relative to those sectors. He said that depending on their political economic theories, too, workers differed on
the possible effects of NAFTA. By no means could a specific position on NAFTA be attributed to someone simply because he or she was a member of a union.

Also in Mexico City, a radio journalist who specialized in education policy told us that while general information on el TLC was everywhere, including distribution through the national curriculum, specific information about the policy was very hard to find, even for her as a journalist. She said that she thought that education in the very technical language of such policies as NAFTA needed to be more widespread so that people could really debate what was happening.

In rural Kentucky, in 1993, I talked with two young tobacco farmers, Dot and Tommy, who were also trying to inform themselves about GATT and NAFTA. They belong to an organization that was started through Willy Nelson’s FARM AID concerts, and it is through that organization that they have been getting information and doing political lobbying against NAFTA and GATT. Their opposition to NAFTA and GATT was largely related to their fears about Argentinean tobacco coming into the U.S. through Mexico—with NAFTA opening up a gateway for all Latin American agricultural products, in their view. Yet, at the same time, they were beginning to employ Mexican migrant workers (a new labor trend in that region) in order to produce their own tobacco crops. Here are Dot’s views about public discussions of transnational policies in her community:

I don’t want to say [the farmers here are] not paying attention to what’s happening because they are aware of it, but it’s that they’re so caught up in the survival, getting their crop in, getting onto the next step. They really don’t have time to be active and, you know, our organization helps us a little bit because it keeps us up to date and we can be a little bit more educated on the issues and who we need to call, when and where we need to be, you know, to support a certain issue or something but... I don’t think that the total community has a clue what [NAFTA] could do to the economy here. It could even wipe it out, if it would go into effect the way that it is.... So I guess basically what I’m saying is that we, as farmers, in our organization, basically are against everything that NAFTA stands for at this point. There isn’t anything that is going to benefit me or anybody like me and it’s totally not to my advantage, totally to my
disadvantage and even to my entire community... This entire community is just
going to be wiped off of the map. Basically, people are just going to straggle
along if they happen to have some type of means of support and I see no good,
anyways, in its structure right now and I'm gonna fight it to the nail.

There were several related issues for Dot and Tommy. They wanted markets to be open
enough for their tobacco to sell internationally, but not enough to replace their own growing
elsewhere. Latin American labor in the U.S. was fine with them, as long as the knowledge to
produce their cash crop was not exported to Latin American countries.

Another business person with a different perspective on NAFTA in 1993, four months
before the U.S. vote on that policy, was a radio station manager in Mexico City. She had been
born in Mexico to U.S. parents, had lived all her life in Mexico, and defined herself as
bicultural. To her, NAFTA was not going to make a big difference in the U.S. or Mexico, since
everything covered by the policy, she felt, was already happening in the corporate community.

A couple we interviewed in rural Morelos, in a field of dying cucumbers and peppers
due to the 1993 drought, said that their lifestyle as campesinos was over anyway, given the
drought and the inhumane taxation and credit policies of the state and national governments,
so they might as well pray for some factory owner to come and want to buy their land. (Just
as a note here, no factories ever came.) Their children were all working as seasonal
agricultural workers in Canada. (They had airfare there as part of the job's pay.) The parents
said they didn't have enough labor at home to harvest the market vegetables even if they
hadn't dried up, so they might as well get out of the business. But, they wondered, how
would they eat, and how would they pay the new taxes on the house with no access to credit?
Maybe NAFTA would do something—things couldn't get any worse, they said.
After NAFTA

Jorge Carrasco Araizaga, a journalist who has been following global economic policy since before NAFTA was passed, explained to me in November, 1994, his perspective on what NAFTA has meant so far for Mexicans, and what he saw as the significance of GATT. (See Appendix II for a translation.)

El Tratado de Libre Comercio lo que va a hacer y está haciendo en México es: dividir perfectamente el país en dos. Yo creo que este país lo que está haciendo es, o el Tratado de Libre Comercio va, y no solo el Tratado de Libre Comercio, en general todas las relaciones económicas de México hacia en la relación con el exterior, con la economía global, va a permitir que unos participen y otros no. Van a participar aquellos que tienen información, aquellos que saben participar, aquellos que trabajen en empresas multinacionales, no sólo en las fábricas, pero también en servicios, ¿no? Y por otra parte creo que hay gente que no está conectada con ese mundo...

Yo creo que el gran problema de México es la injusta distribución de la riqueza... Yo creo que el Tratado de Libre Comercio, no hay que santanizarlo, no es malo en sí mismo. El problema, yo siento que es más en lo que es la distribución del ingreso en México... En México tenemos 25 ricos impresionantemente ricos contra 25 millones de personas impresionantemente pobres, entonces el contraste es abismal, 25 personas que tienen la riqueza del país contra 25 millones que no tiene nada. No es la situación de Estados Unidos. No es la situación de Canadá... Por supuesto que hay pobres y por supuesto que hay millonarios pero hay una amplia clase media. En México lo que ha pasado es que la clase media se ha empobrecido terriblemente en los últimos 12, 15 años... Este fue un año anormal, podemos decir como en la película, es el año en que vivimos en peligro, ¿no?

North American Connections: A Travel Story

On the Day of the Dead, November 2, 1994, in Mexico City, drummers stood on the zócalo, the central plaza constructed by the Spanish colonizers over the Mixtec capital. On that site of so many centuries of political contestation, they beat out the rhythm to the familiar political chant "El pueblo, unido, jamás será vencido" (The people, united, will never be defeated.)
Dancers joined the growing circle from the passing crowd. No one was singing the words, so no words could be silenced. A day earlier, those indigenous solidarity activists and the altars for the Day of the Dead had been removed forcibly from the central plaza by federal soldiers and metropolitan police. They were not alone. Hunger-striking Zapatistas from Chiapas were chased with clubs at 1:00 a.m. to another part of the Federal District, along with those who had been selling EZLN news magazines, t-shirts and buttons. Gone, too, were the PRD supporters who registered voters under a picture of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.

The zócalo was cleared because of the sexto informe, in which President Salinas de Gortari would officially address Mexico for the last time. On that morning, truckloads and busses of metropolitan police from other parts of the city arrived in the zócalo and they stood shoulder to shoulder with soldiers from the National Palace, surrounding the entire, empty, plaza. Gates were erected to prevent free entry into the zócalo, except for those who carried credentials stating that they were members of the PRI. Inside the barricades, PRI hats and banners were distributed to those who stood for three hours waiting for the arrival of President Salinas de Gortari from the Casa de Diputados, in which he gave the sexto informe.

Members of those unions supporting, and supported by, Salinas and the PRI were allowed into the zócalo. Members of the shoemaking union, who work in one of those sectors hard-hit by NAFTA, were not allowed in. On surrounding streets, contesting the official display of popular support in the central plaza, there were PRD (Democratic Revolutionary Party), CND (National Democratic Convention), and Zapatista rallies. In the Marcha de marchas, coffins bearing the PRD insignia were carried toward the zócalo, representing each of the 291 PRD supporters who were killed during the Salinas presidency. Marchers were stopped before they reached the zócalo, and the coffins were broken into pieces by the police (La jornada 11/2/94).

During these graphic demonstrations of division over political control of the Mexican nation, there was agreement across party lines in Mexico on one issue: condemnation of Governor Wilson of California and Proposition 187. President Salinas de Gortari, at that time
one of three finalists in a world-wide search for a leader for the World Trade Organization, presented his final address very much to a world audience. While the address tended to portray Mexicans as supportive of ongoing economic ties with the U.S. and as united behind the NAFTA he negotiated, President Salinas de Gortari made this remark in his address:

Local political interests in California tend to blame Mexican workers for that society's problems. Mexico affirms its rejection of this xenophobic campaign and will continue to act in defense of the labor and human rights of our migrant workers. (Salinas de Gortari 1994)

In diplomatic letters sent to the U.S. State Department, the Mexican government was even more forthright about its position on California Proposition 187 (See Appendix II for a translation):

El gobierno de México cree que el clima de hostilidad y la creciente incidencia del abuso y hostigamiento contra nacionales mexicanos, aunadas al riesgo de ver afectados los intercambios económicos y comerciales, incide negativamente en la relación bilateral entre México y Estados Unidos.

México considera que tales actitudes antiinmigrantes, e incluso antimexicanas, alentadas por la argumentación que da sustento a la proposición 187, son a todas luces contrarias al espíritu de cooperación y enfrentamiento (bilateral). (El Día, 10/29/94:3)

This point was made even more strongly in some other venues. California Governor Pete Wilson was portrayed by political cartoonists on the front pages of several Mexican newspapers in the weeks before the U.S. elections as, alternatively, a NAZI or a member of the Ku Klux Klan [Figures 3 and 4.] A boycott by Mexicans of U.S. companies, like McDonald's, in California and in Mexico, caused an 80% drop in California sales during the last weekend in October, 1994, according to several Mexican press sources.

Members of the EZLN and the CNPI (Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indios) who decided to challenge the national government of Mexico on Article 8 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to petition, had been hunger-striking in Mexico City for twenty days on November 2, without an audience. Their spokesman told me in an interview that the struggle in Chiapas is related to the struggle against Proposition 187 in California. (See Appendix II for an English translation.)

Si los gringos quieren robarse nuestro petróleo y robarse nuestro territorio como ya se roban nuestra mano de obra, habrá guerra siempre. [Pete Wilson] dice vamos aquí a eliminar al mal prieto que son los mexicanos, los latinos
Figure 3

Los Caricaturistas
fourth week of October, 1994

1940

HITLER

1994

PETE WILSON

MEXICO
Figure 4

"One for all, and all... against the undocumented."

Los Caricaturistas
fourth week of October, 1994

KUKUXKLANES

UNO PARA TODO
Y TODOS... CONTRA
LOS INDOCUMENTADOS...
The military had just removed members of three communities in Chiapas from their land in order to give it to a California-based agribusiness. The hunger strikers were protesting that action along with many others.

In Capitola, California, on the day after U.S. elections, police stood on the entrance ramps to Highways One and Seventeen ready to move on hundreds of protesters of Propositions 187 and 184 who stopped traffic for two hours and chanted “El pueblo, unido, jamás será vencido.”

Postscript: August 1995, Mexico City

The historical parallel drawn by Sr. Hugo portrays the economic crisis in Mexico today as even worse than during the Porfiriato. During the week between the Consulta Nacional (the first independently monitored vote in over six decades, called by the EZLN) and the primer informe (the first annual address to the nation) of President Ernesto Zedillo, these words could be found on the editorial page of a new periodical called Boletín Mexicano de La Crisis (translated in Appendix II):

(...) el PRI, en estos precisos momentos, unos días previos al primer informe de Ernesto Zedillo, está sufriendo un colapso histórico. El PRI se colapsa como la ciudad capital se colapsó hace exactamente diez años (...)

El PRI hoy se colapsa, junto con una democracia que navega a la deriva y no por esos malosos a los que se refirió el presidente Ernesto Zedillo sino, acajo, por su propia gente. (Boletín Mexicano de La Crisis 2, 8/26/95:2)

There is definitely more of a demonstration in Mexico of “public” agency now than in 1993, although most people I have talked with say that it will take more time for it to result in public control of domestic and transnational policy.

On the day of la Consulta Nacional, in which a majority of the 1,200,000 Mexicans who

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6 This California Proposition, which the electorate also approved, made changes in the mandatory sentencing legislation and became known as the “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” bill because it linked a third conviction to a mandatory life sentence.
voted (monitored by the Alianza Cívica, a citizens' alliance) asked the EZLN to become a political force for change⁷, an interview by Carmen Lira (of La Jornada) with Subcomandante Marcos of the EZLN, in Chiapas, was published. He told her that the EZLN did not look upon itself as a political end, but as a medium of public transformation:

Lo que el EZLN tiene que ofrecerle a la sociedad mexicana es alguien que escuche sus demandas y que le haga caso, que lo tome en cuenta. Y esa cultura sí la construimos y sí aprendimos a hacerla, porque así fue como crecimos, si no seguiríamos siendo ocho o doce. (La Jornada, 8/27/95:11)

Thus, publics continue to define ourselves, at times calling for accountability of those who claim to negotiate on our behalf.

A Few Conclusions

1. Understandings of transnational events and processes are always local, and our academic analyses of them might be more appropriately thought of as "multilocal" rather than "transnational."

2. NAFTA, a policy which will not be fully implemented for 15 years, if various publics still allow it to proceed, has not been easy to read in terms of pro- or contra- public positions. This is not only because the policy itself has so many dimensions that one might hold contradictory positions in relation to the document, but also because the stakes have been articulated and interpreted very differently in different localities.

3. Collapsing imagery of national publics, while an effective political strategy, can gloss over so much important diversity of opinions and experiences... For example, an iconic representation of the Zapatistas as all rural Mexican activists disallows discussion of many

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⁷ The leadership of the EZLN has stated clearly that they do not intend to call for laying down arms until the January 1, 1994 demand for basic constitutional rights is met for all Mexicans. Also, the EZLN does not have plans to become an official national political party.
other movements and events, some of which predated the EZLN, like those in Jonacátepec.

4. Rejection of the power of nation-states, and their heads, to negotiate on behalf of "publics" comes in a diversity of social forms: the Saskatoon farmers, for example, who said Mulroney might sign NAFTA for Canada, but not for them; the Zapatistas, who have challenged the PRI's inattention to multicultural and rural economic issues in Mexico; and the many militias, in the U.S., which have challenged federal authority in several ways, perhaps including the bombing of the Oklahoma federal building.
APPENDIX I

This is the text of Proposition 187, taken from the California Ballot Pamphlet, distributed to all registered voters through the U.S. mail. This proposition was on the ballot for the November 8, 1994 general elections.

Proposition 187: Text of Proposed Law

This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution.

This initiative measure adds sections to various codes; therefore, new provisions proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW

SECTION 1. Findings and Declaration.

The People of California find and declare as follows:

(a) With respect to any person who is arrested, and suspected of being present in the United States is violation of federal immigration laws, every law enforcement agancy shall do the following:

(1) Attempt to verify the legal status of such person as a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, an alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time or as an alien who is present in the United States in violation of immigration laws. The verification process may include, but shall not be limited to, questioning the person regarding his or her date and place of birth, and entry into the United States, and demanding documentation to indicate his or her legal status.

(2) Notify the person of his or her apparent status as an alien who is present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws and inform him or her that, apart from any criminal justice proceedings, he or she must either obtain legal status or leave the United States.

(3) Notify the Attorney General of California and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status and provide any additional information that may be requested by any other public entity.

(b) Any legislative, administrative, or other action by a city, county, or other legally authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional power, or by a law enforcement agency, to prevent or limit the cooperation required by subsection (a) is expressly prohibited.


Section 113 is added to the Penal Code, to read:

113. Any person who manufactires, distributes or sells false documents to conceal the true citizenship or resident alien status of another person is guilt of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five years or by a fine of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000).

SECTION 3. Use of False Citizenship or Resident Alien Documents: Crime and Punishment.

Section 114 is added to the Penal Code, to read:

114. Any person who uses false documents to conceal his or her true citizenship or resident alien status is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five years or by a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).

SECTION 4. Law Enforcement Cooperation with INS.

Section 834b is added to the Penal Code, to read:

834b. (a) Law enforcement agencies in California shall fully cooperate with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding any person who is arrested if he or she is suspected of being present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.

(b) In order to carry out the intention of the People of California that only citizens of the United States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United States may receive the benefits of public social services and to ensure that all persons employed in the providing of those services shall diligently protect public funds from misuse, the provisions of this section are adopted.

(c) Any public entity in this state to whom a person has applied for public social services determines or reasonably suspects, based upon the information provided to it, that the person is an alien in the United States in violation of federal law, the following procedures shall be followed by the public entity:

(1) The entity shall not provide the person with benefits or services.

(2) The entity shall, in writing, notify the person of his or her apparent illegal status.

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immigration status, and that the person must either obtain legal status or leave the United States.

(3) The entity shall also notify the State Director of Social Services, the Attorney General of California, and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status, and shall provide any additional information that may be requested by any other public entity.


Chapter 13 (commencing with Section 130) is added to Part 1 of Division 1 of the Health and Safety Code, to read:

Chapter 13. Publicly-Funded Health Care Services

130. (a) In order to carry out the intention of the People of California that, excepting emergency medical care as required by federal law, only citizens of the United States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United States may receive the benefits of publicly-funded health care, and to ensure that all persons employed in the providing of such services shall diligently protect public funds from misuse, the provisions of this section are adopted.

(b) A person shall not receive any health care services from a publicly-funded health care facility to which he or she is otherwise entitled until the legal status of that person has been verified as one of the following:

(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.

(c) If any publicly-funded health care facility in this state from whom a person seeks health care services, other than emergency medical care as required by federal law, determines or reasonably suspects, based upon the information provided to it, that the person is an alien in the United States in violation of federal law, the following procedures shall be followed by the facility:

(1) The facility shall not provide the person with services.
(2) The facility shall, in writing, notify the person of his or her apparent illegal immigration status, and that the person must either obtain legal status or leave the United States.

(d) The facility shall also notify the State Director of Health Services, the Attorney General of California, and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status, and shall provide any additional information that may be requested by any other public entity.

(e) For purposes of this section, "publicly-funded health care facility" shall be defined as specified in Sections 1200 and 1250 of this code as of January 1, 1993.


Section 42215 is added to the Education Code, to read:

42215. (a) No public elementary or secondary school shall admit, enroll, or permit the attendance of any child who is not a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, or a person who is otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.

(b) Commencing January 1, 1996, each school district shall verify the legal status of each child enrolling in the school district for the first time in order to ensure the enrollment or attendance only of citizens, aliens lawfully admitted as permanent residents, or persons who are otherwise authorized to be present in the United States.

(c) By January 1, 1996, each school district shall have verified the legal status of each child already enrolled and in attendance in the school district in order to ensure the enrollment or attendance only of citizens, aliens lawfully admitted as permanent residents, or persons who are otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.

(d) By January 1, 1996, each school district shall also have verified the legal status of each parent or guardian of each child referred to in subdivisions (b) and (c), to determine whether such parent or guardian is one of the following:

(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.

(3) An alien admitted lawfully for a temporary period of time.

(e) Each school district shall provide information to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Attorney General of California, and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, regarding any illegal or permanent resident, or parent or guardian, attending a public elementary or secondary school in the school district determined or reasonably suspected to be in violation of federal immigration laws within forty-five days after becoming aware of an apparent violation. The notice shall also be provided to the parent or legal guardian of the enrollee or pupil, and shall state that an existing pupil may not continue to attend the school after ninety calendar days from the date of the notice, unless legal status is published.

(f) For each child who cannot establish legal status in the United States, each school district shall continue to provide education for a period of ninety days from the date of the notice. Such ninety day period shall be utilized to accomplish an orderly transition to a school in the child's country of origin. Each school district shall fully cooperate in this transition effort to ensure that the educational needs of the child are best served for that period of time.

SECTION 8. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Postsecondary Educational Institutions.

Section 69910.8 is added to the Education Code, to read:

69910.8. (a) No public institution of postsecondary education shall admit, enroll, or permit the attendance of any person who is not a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident in the United States, or a person who is otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.

(b) Commencing with the first term or semester that begins after January 1, 1995, and at the commencement of each term or semester thereafter, each public postsecondary educational institution shall verify the status of each person enrolled or in attendance at that institution in order to ensure the enrollment or attendance only of United States citizens, aliens lawfully admitted as permanent residents in the United States, and persons who are otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.

(c) No later than 45 days after the admissions officer of a public postsecondary educational institution becomes aware of the application, enrollment, or attendance of a person determined to be, or who is under reasonable suspicion of being, in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws, that officer shall provide that information to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Attorney General of California, and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. The information shall also be provided to the applicant, enrollee, or person admitted.

SECTION 9. Attorney General Cooperation with the INS.

Section 63099.65 is added to the Government Code, to read:

63099.65. Whenever the state or a city, or a county, or any other locally authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries reports the presence of a person who is suspected of being present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws to the Attorney General of California, that report shall be transmitted to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Attorney General shall be responsible for maintaining on-going and accurate records of such reports, and shall provide any additional information that may be requested by any other governmental entity.

SECTION 10. Amendment and Severability.

The statutory provisions contained in this measure may not be amended by the Legislature except to further its purposes by statute passed in each house by roll-call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective only when approved by the voters.

In the event that any portion of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect any other provision or application of the act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to that extent the provisions of this act are severable.
APPENDIX II
English Translations of Interview Excerpts

I. Sr. Hugo, Morelos farmer

"Well, according to anyone, maybe the government has finished with Mexico. Because where are we going to go? The crisis in basic foods has begun, mostly because of the drought—those who have a little corn don't sell it. They don't want to sell any more because they have to eat, and if they don't have corn they have to buy it.

That's the idea; all of us adults think that people are going to start selling their ejido lands in order to buy something to eat, and I myself do not understand why the government has applied [the changes in] Article 27. According to what our elders have told us, around the year 1878, people came from some place else—nobody knew where they came from, or what nation they belonged to—and they bought a plot of land and the neighbors had to sign for the sale of that land and they received, too, the rate that they signed for. It was a robbery, then, and that's where we are headed again with the changes in Article 27 because the government says now that it has the right to sell land at the price it wants, to whoever it wants.

That is a bad step, because that already happened with our ancestors. The hacienda appropriated... that is to say, the Spaniards came with the power accorded by Spain to buy [land] at perhaps a high price, what do I know, but the worst is what happened: the neighbors had to sign away lands also, and if all the land was not bought, it was robbery.

According to the government, the change in Article 27 goes along with the adjustment in the currency and the currency exchange. How is this going to benefit the poor? If today he is earning 25-30,000 pesos, the peasant is not going to have a better standard of living [with 25-30 pesos], and how is it possible that 1,000 pesos drops to 1 peso? If a person can't make a living with 25,000 pesos, how is he going to make a living with 25 pesos? How is he going to survive at all?

I understand it this way: according to what the government says, is that our country can have business with another, for free, that's what free trade means... And I don't understand that; if that multimillionaire is going to profit by that business, what's going to be free, or how is he going to be affected? That's where competition comes from—if they make it better, they're going to sell it. It's like finding out who's the stupidiest; at the end, the one that wins, loses, and no
thank you.

Our president tells us that he is going to help the community with the change in Article 27 and in the currency. A lie. A lie. It's a big lie.

Like in the Porfiriato [the era of President Porfirio Díaz]. Because this is how it was, the poor people here in Morelos had to work in sugar cane, and carry the cane until someone called "Zapata" came along who wanted to take off the yoke of the poor... My father [and uncle] were revolutionaries.

Well, if agriculture goes the way I think it's going, we'll have to take a stand because it is the primary material. Agriculture provides the means for life. If you take for example a home with five or six children, a family of eight with the mother and father, and four go away to work and two stay, to work the land, then they can sustain themselves. [Without agricultural land] how will the parents survive? If everybody goes away, are the parents supposed to eat air? One would have to be a balloon!"

II. 18-year-old UNAM student in a 1993 interview:
Q: Why do you think that there's so much being said about the treaty in Mexico?
A: Because it's in style.

Q: Don't you think that there is some reason for their wanting one to know all this in Mexico?
A: Somewhere I read that the more informed we are, the more misinformed we are going to be. In other words, the more we are hit with information, the less we are going to grasp things. So, if we have a huge scope of information about it and daily we are told that, I think we'll end up sick of the theme and basically not giving it any importance and it is for that reason I say we are so misinformed even though the same information is reaching us from all sides.

III. Jorge Carrasco Araizaga, journalist:
"What NAFTA is going to do and has been doing in Mexico is: divide the country completely in half. I think what is happening in this country is, and not only the Free Trade Treaty but in general all the external economic relations Mexico has, with the global economy, is going to permit some to participate and others not to. Those who have information, who know how to participate, those who work in international business, not only in factories but also in services,
are going to participate. And on the other hand I think there are people who are not connected with that world.

I think that Mexico's biggest problem is the unjust distribution of wealth... I believe that one must not satanize NAFTA; it is not bad in itself. I think the problem is more in the distribution of income in Mexico... In Mexico, we have 25 rich people, incredibly rich, against 25 million incredibly poor people; so the contrast is abysmal between the 25 people who have the wealth of the country and the 25 million who have nothing. It's not the same situation as in Canada or the U.S. Of course there are poor people, and of course there are millionaires in those countries, but there is an extensive middle class. In Mexico, what has happened is that the middle class has become terribly impoverished in the last 12, 15 years.... This was an abnormal year, we could say, as in the film, it's the year in which we have been living dangerously."

IV. Mexican State Department to U.S. State Department:
"The government of Mexico believes that the hostile climate, and the growing incidence of abuse and harassment of Mexican nationals, is at the risk of affecting economic and commercial interchanges, and affects negatively bilateral relations between Mexico and the U.S.

Mexico considers such anti-immigrant attitudes, including anti-Mexican attitudes, to be encouraged by the arguments embodied in Proposition 187. They are in every way contrary to the spirit of cooperation and bilateral exchange."

V. Zapatista hunger striker:
"If the gringos want to rob us of our oil and of our land like they already rob us of our labor, then there will always be war. [Pete Wilson] says that we are going to eliminate all those nasty Mexicans, the Latin Americans, and we are not going to give them education. We are not going to give them services. But they don't know that they have wealth thanks to those nasty Mexicans. There will be war."

VI. Editorial page of Boletín Mexicano de la Crisis:
"(...) the PRI, in these precise moments, a few days before the first annual address of Ernesto Zedillo, is suffering an historic collapse. The PRI is collapsing just like the capital city collapsed exactly ten years ago (...)"
The PRI is collapsing today, along with an adrift democracy, and not because of those bad guys to whom Zedillo refers, but through the efforts of [Mexico's] own people."

VII. Subcomandante Marcos, to Carmen Lira (La Jornada):
"That which the EZLN has to offer to Mexican society is someone who will listen to its demands and make a case for them, take them into account. And yes, we are constructing this culture, and yes, we are learning to do it, because that's how we grew; if we hadn't, we would have remained 8 or 12."
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